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ABSTRACT 
While Thailand has a long history of military-led coups, most observers believed that the 
establishment of democracy in 1992 had put the country on a new course. It had not. In 
2006, the military overthrew the elected government and attempted to reshape the 
country’s political system in order to favor its interests and those of its civilian and royal 
allies. This event symbolized a period of instability and mass protest, which began nine 
months earlier and had been unseen since the 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to 
explain why Thai politics took this unexpected turn. Its main hypothesis is that political 
instability is a result of increased political and societal polarization that has its roots in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and which peaked during the early 2000s under the government of 
Thaksin Shinawatra and the Thai Rak Thai Party. This thesis shows that constitutional 
changes in the late 1990s led to a sharp increase in polarization because they encouraged 
the emergence of a two-party system. It concludes that while Thailand did, in fact, 
become more democratic in the 1990s, it also became more deeply divided. The stage 
was set for a coup and political instability when opponents of the traditional elites were 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the last several years, political instability has increased sharply in Thailand. 
While Thailand has had a history of military-led coups, many observers believed that the 
establishment of democracy in 1992 had put the country on a new course. It had not. 
Since 2006, ideological divides between Red Shirts, who support Thaksin’s Thai Rak 
Thai (TRT) Party, and Yellow Shirts, who oppose the TRT Party and are supported by 
the Democrat Party, continue over the legitimacy of governments and have led to mass 
protests, and at times, violence. Changes in the parliament’s relations with the monarchy 
and the military present challenges that have yet to be resolved. Military intervention in 
politics, while thought to be a thing of the past, remains a threat to the consolidation of 
democracy. 
Given the relatively long time span between the 1991 and 2006 coups, observers 
began to think that democracy had been consolidated in Thailand. A new regime was 
crafted to help create and sustain stability within the political arena. While military coups 
have been a constant part of Thailand’s history, with over 18 occurring since the 
formation of its constitutional monarchy in 1932, many observers believed that the 
formation of a democratic regime would end the military’s overt intervention in politics 
and create a stable form of government. Scholars of democratic transition and 
consolidation saw Thailand moving steadily toward democracy and away from 
authoritarian rule. 
In 2006, all of this changed. With over fifteen years having passed since the last 
coup, the military once again blatantly intervened in politics, forming a military-led 
government and removing Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai 
Party from power. This event was surprising, as only a couple months before the coup, 
“few analysts foresaw Thailand’s political situation deteriorating into a coup d’état.”1 But 
                                                 
1 Colum Murphy, “For King and Country?” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2006, Eastern Edition. 
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even after the military returned the government to civilian elected officials in 2007, the 
problems associated with democratic instability did not go away. This development is 
significant in Thai history, as the return of power to parliamentary government following 
past coups in Thai history did not lead to this level of instability. After almost six years 
following the 2006 coup, the country remains unstable. This thesis aims to answer the 
following question: What has caused democratic instability in Thailand since the 1991 
coup? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Scholars of Thai politics have yet to pinpoint the reasons behind Thailand’s 
continued instability. While many thought Thailand had consolidated democracy between 
1992 and 2006, the fact that a coup occurred proved otherwise. Academics continue to 
study the reasons for the coup and how democracy within Thailand may look in the 
future. The complex mix of multiple actors involved in governmental affairs suggests 
several explanations as to why there continues to be political instability. However, no 
definitive answer has been presented. 
Since the election of Yingluck Shinawatra in 2011, there has been steady talk 
about the possibility of another coup occurring. Political instability remains, despite the 
military returning power to elected officials in 2007. While the time frame from 1992–
2006 is seen as phases of democratic advancement, a military coup in September 2006 
interrupted this development, showing that despite steady efforts to consolidate 
democracy in the country, there remained the possibility of military intervention in 
politics. This possibility remains evident today. 
Lastly, Thailand has been a key regional partner of the United States for the past 
60 years. As instability continues within Thai politics and society, impacting civil-
military relations, interactions between the parliament, the monarchy, and the civilian 
elites, Thailand’s relationship with the United States has become more complicated. A 
stable Thailand is strategically important to the United States due to its status as a U.S. 
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treaty ally and as an anchor for U.S. interests in mainland Southeast Asia.2 In the near 
future, the United States must deal with how to respond and continue to balance its 
strategic needs with its imperative to remain a champion of democracy in the region, 
however messy that democracy may be.3 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Scholars of Thai politics have offered two complementary explanations for the 
political instability that led to the 2006 coup. One has to do with the 1997 constitution. 
Some scholars argue that the new constitution had unforeseen consequences within the 
political arena.4 While the 1997 constitution attempted to address many of the political 
challenges that prevented governmental stability in Thailand in the 1980s and first half of 
the 1990s, some academics argue that it created the conditions that made a subsequent 
coup more likely. Prior to the 1991 coup there were a large number of parties that won 
seats in parliament. This led to a severely fragmented parliament, difficulties in forming 
and maintaining coalition governments, and frequent changes of government. Indeed, 
prior to 2005, no government had ever survived a full term in office. One of the primary 
objectives of the 1997 constitution was to limit the number of political parties that could 
win seats in parliament. In this regard, the constitution achieved its goal. In Thailand’s 
2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections, far fewer parties won seats than in previous 
elections. The constitution also increased the prime minister’s influence over the 
legislature and created incentives for small, regional parties to coordinate their election 
campaigns. In combination, these changes to the political system enabled the Thai Rak 
Thai Party to become the first in Thai history to secure an outright majority in parliament.  
With support from his majority party, Prime Minister Thaksin was able to push 
most of his agendas through parliament. As competition decreased, the executive 
                                                 
2 U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations” (RL32593; Dec. 
8, 2011), by Emma Chanlett-Avery. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Allen Hicken, “Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai,” Journal of 
East Asian Studies 6, no. 3 (2006); Erik Kuhonta, “The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 ‘People’s 
Constitution’: Be Careful What You Wish For,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008); James Ockey, “Change and 
Continuity in the Thai Political Party System,” Asian Survey 43, no. 4 (2003). 
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branch’s power increased. The military and monarchy were considerably less able to 
influence Thaksin and keep him in check as they had with many of his predecessors.5 
Thaksin drew allegations from the historically dominant Democrat Party and related new 
street-protesting Yellow Shirts, such as abuse of power, insulting the monarchy, policy 
corruption favoring sectional interests, exceptional levels of vote buying, human rights 
abuses, and interference in the independent agencies of the state. 
The second common explanation for increasing instability in Thai politics 
prior to 2006 concerns the close relationship between the military and the monarchy, 
which found their positions increasingly challenged by the Thai Rak Thai Party and 
its leader, Prime Minister Thaksin. As mentioned above, the Thai military has a long 
history of overthrowing governments, even other military ones. The reasons for each 
coup have varied over time. However, many scholars agree that the preservation  
of military autonomy remains the most important factor, and this concern seems to 
have been especially strong in 2006.6 The 1997 constitution, while supported by  
the military, reduced military participation in politics.7 For instance, participation  
of active duty officers in the cabinet ended and representation of military officers in 
the Senate declined substantially.8 This consequently reduced the military’s ability to 
sustain its political influence in government and, in turn, its autonomy. Complicating 
matters, Thaksin chose to exercise control over the military directly by becoming 
involved in military promotions that were viewed as nepotism and disdainful  
of tradition and merit. As Thaksin continued to gain control over the military, the 
more he created polarization between two groups: One side included Thaksin,  
                                                 
5 Federico Ferrara, “Thailand: Minimally Stable, Minimally Democratic,” International Political 
Science Review 32, no. 5 (2011), 524. 
6 Paul Chambers, “Where Agency Meets Structure: Understanding Civil-Military Relations in 
Contemporary Thailand,” Asian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (2011); Federico Ferrara, “Thailand: 
Minimally Stable, Minimally Democratic,” International Political Science Review 32, no. 5 (2011); 
Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 4 
(2005). 
7 Amy Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Malaysia (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 50. 
8 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz, “Breaking with the Past?: Democratic Change and 
the Quest for Civilian Control in East Asia.” East West Center Policy Studies 62, (2012), 29. 
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his Thai Rak Thai Party, and the national police, and, on the other side, the majority 
of the military, monarchy, and Democrats. 
Today, academics point to the monarchy as a key source of the military’s 
legitimacy in politics. As long as the monarchy remains strong and continues to support 
the military and vice versa, civilian control over the military will be difficult. The result 
is likely continued military participation in politics and the threat of a coup if the status 
quo of military autonomy or monarchical popularity is challenged or changed. 
This thesis hypothesizes that polarization has caused political instability in 
Thailand beginning shortly after Thaksin’s election in 2001. The polarization was 
between two coalitions of forces. On the one hand are the Thai Rak Thai Party and their 
supporters in the streets, the Red Shirts; and, on the other hand, are the Democrat Party, 
military, monarchy, and Yellow Shirts. As long as the polarization exists, the prospect for 
further instability and coups will remain significant. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the “third wave” of global democratization, more than 60 countries shifted 
from authoritarian rule toward some kind of democratic regime.9 Academics who studied 
these transitions realized that sustaining democracy was often a task as difficult as 
establishing it. They adopted the term “democratic consolidation” to describe “the 
challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond 
the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of 
building dams against eventual ‘reverse waves.’”10 This definition has become more 
complex over time, as academics identify multiple elements needed for successful 
democratization. Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that consolidated democracies 
share certain key characteristics, including internal stability, free and fair elections, 
civilian control of the military, rule of law, protection of human rights, and separation of 
institutional powers. 
                                                 
9 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation,” in The Global Divergence of Democracies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
10 Ibid., 149. 
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Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan created a narrower definition of democratic 
consolidation that combines attitudinal, constitutional and behavioral dimensions.11 
Attitudinally, “a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public 
opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most 
appropriate way to govern collective life in a society.”12 According to Larry Diamond, 
the consolidation of democracy requires “broad and deep legitimation, such that all 
significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic 
regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic 
alternative they can imagine.”13 In a survey conducted in 2004, 84.3 percent of Thai 
citizens stated that democracy is always preferable to authoritarian forms of government 
and over 90 percent indicated confidence in the ability of democracy to solve problems of 
the nation.14 These statistics show that from an attitudinal perspective, Thailand had a 
consolidated democracy leading up to the 2006 coup. 
Constitutionally, “a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and 
nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, 
and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.”15 Constitutionally, Thailand was 
a consolidated democracy leading up to the 2006 coup. Within Thailand, the period 
between 1992 and 2001 was filled with government corruption, a steady refrain 
throughout Thai history and one that continues today. Not a single administration served 
a full term in office due to accusations by the opposition of repeat corruption violations. 
The 1997 constitution was designed to help eliminate corruption and vote buying through 
a number of reforms that strengthened monitoring institutions, political parties, and civil 
society. New constitutionally mandated independent government institutions were 
                                                 
11 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
12 Ibid., 6.  
13 Larry Diamond “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal Of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996), 33. 
14 Robert B. Albritton, Thawilwadee Bureekul, “Developing electoral Democracy in Developing 
Nations: Thailand,” A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development, Asian Barometer 
Project Office, 2004.  
15 Linz and Stephan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 6. 
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created to help fight problems with corruption and vote buying. These new institutions 
included the Election Commission (EC) which would monitor all elections for election 
fraud, the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) which would be 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption petitions, and the Constitution 
Court, which would be used to conduct rulings on the constitutionality of actions or 
laws.16 These new institutions added what Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino call 
“horizontal accountability.”17 However, despite these institutions attempting to do the 
jobs for which they were intended, they themselves have been accused of being overly 
accommodating toward particular political elites and of being subjective in who they 
chose to investigate and which elections they validate. The selection of members into 
these commissions are also claimed to have become partisan and political.18 
The constitution also contained many reforms aimed at changing Thai politics 
within parliament and encouraging stability. As noted, it aimed at creating a more 
cohesive parliament with fewer parties. Due to incentives for smaller parties to join 
coalitions and coordinate election efforts, the number of parties decreased leading up to 
the 2001 election. Overall, major parties accepted the changes provided by the new 
constitution and conducted themselves according to its rules.  
Behaviorally, “a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no actor 
spends significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-
democratic regime or turning to violence.”19 Until a few years before the 2006 coup, 
behaviorally, Thailand can be seen as democratically consolidated.20 However, there are 
elements that show a reversal of democratic consolidation as violence increased right 
before the coup and continued to increase after. Two “wars against drugs” in 2003 and 
                                                 
16 Kitti Prasirtsuk, “From Political Reform and Economic Crisis to Coup d’état in Thailand: The 
Twists and Turns of the Political Economy, 1997–2006,” Asian Survey 47, no. 6 (2007), 880. 
17 Larry Diamond, Leonardo Morlino, “An Overview,” Journal of Democracy 15 no. 4 (2004), 24. 
18 Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Malaysia, 55.  
19 Linz and Stephan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 6. 
20 Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Malaysia, 10.  
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2005 saw over 4,000 extrajudicial killings, encouraged by the prime minister and carried 
out by the police, military, and influential people. The southern insurgency within three 
of five predominantly Muslim provinces was quiet in the 1990s, but intensified starting in 
2004, in large part due to intra-governmental rivalries. Prime Minister Thaksin declared 
martial law in the insurgent provinces in January 2004 and later replaced martial law with 
an emergency decree in July 2005. Despite efforts to subdue violence in the region before 
and after the coup, the insurgency still exists today. 
Other violence stems from the Red and Yellow Shirt conflict. Allegations of 
corruption arose following another Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai Party landslide victory in 
the 2005 elections. Leading up to the coup, The People’s Alliance for Democracy, 
identified by their yellow shirts representing the color of the king, began peacefully 
protesting against Thaksin, accusing him of corruption, abuse of power, coming to and 
maintaining power illegally, and inadequate loyalty to the monarchy. Confrontations took 
place between Yellow Shirt protestors, and those hired to incite violence. Bombs 
exploded near Thaksin’s car and outside the home of former prime minister and Privy 
Council member Prem Tinsulanond. 
 In March of 2009, following the coup and the return of a civilian-led government 
in 2007, Red Shirts began protesting. Formally known as the United Front for Democracy 
Against Dictatorship, the Red Shirts claim the military ousted an elected government in 
2006 and that the subsequent government led by the Democrats came to power illegally. 
They called for the return of the Thai Rak Thai Party and its leader from self-imposed 
exile, and the dropping of his conviction charges of corruption. While protests began with 
a series of sit-ins outside government offices, protests escalated to violence. Clashes 
between military troops and protesters left nearly 100 people killed in April and May 
2010. The polarization between Red and Yellow Shirts, formed by elites on both sides, 
contributed to increased violence and the reversal of democratic consolidation on 
behavioral dimensions. 
Other scholars of Thai politics offer different explanations for the instability of 
democracy in Thailand. In their view, some of the main causes of instability include the 
history of military coups, persistent military autonomy from civilian control despite 
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elected civilian politicians controlling the government, and the military’s traditional 
allegiance to the king, not the government. Civilian control is a main element of 
democratizing states. Samuel Huntington describes the ideal type of professional military 
force as being best served under the balance of military and civilian control.21 He states 
that, “The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: 
civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, 
class, and constitutional politics.”22 Without civilian control, militaries are also able to 
continue to act autonomously, preserving their status quo power. Within democratic 
states, civilian control over the military must be exercised so that the government, which 
is responsible for the defense of the nation, the state, and the democratic constitution, 
would be able to exercise its authority to maintain stability within its borders through rule 
of law. 
Narcis Serra, former Spanish Minister of Defense between 1982 and 1991, 
explains the steps necessary to reduce the powers of armed forces during the process of a 
democratic transition.23 He states that progress in democratic transitions must include 
changes within the military. These changes must include legal and institutional reforms, 
changes to the military career structure and doctrine, and control of conflict. Thailand has 
struggled with these elements during its democratic transition. When Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai in 1997 became the first civilian defense minister in 20 years, he was 
unable to implement most military reforms in the way they were intended.24 He 
attempted to improve military efficiency and civilian oversight by reforming military 
promotion procedures, reorganizing the command structure, and reducing the high 
number of generals who did not have military duties. These changes were blocked by 
military veto.25 At no time in the democratic period between 1992 and 2006 were 
                                                 
21 Samuel Huntington, The Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957). 
22 Ibid., 80. 
23 Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
24 Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, “Breaking With the Past?: Democratic Change and the Quest for 
Civilian Control in East Asia,” 36–37. 
25 Ibid., 45.  
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civilians able to “effectively steer core military and defense issues, such as the defense 
budget, weapons acquisition, arms deployment, force structure, and education and 
training.”26 
While former prime ministers have attempted to control the military, two main 
elements have prevented Thailand from building a civilian-led military. First, the military 
pledges its allegiance to the King and the protection of the monarchy, not the 
democratically elected government or constitution. According to Serra, “It goes without 
saying that the loyalty of the military to the democratic government is a basic feature of a 
stable democracy.”27 Duncan McCargo defines the relationship between Thailand’s 
military and monarchy as a “network monarchy.”28 Leading up to the military coup, the 
executive branch under Prime Minister Thaksin was growing stronger due to the Thai 
Rak Thais’ overwhelming majority in parliament. The strength of the executive 
threatened the traditional roles of the monarchy within politics. Recent prime ministers 
not backed by the palace, such as Banharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, only 
lasted a year or so in office; Thaksin, in contrast, remained in office for five years with 
strong parliamentary support.29 The military, at the same time, was being threatened with 
increased civilian control and less political involvement. The relationship with the 
monarchy gave the military the legitimation to conduct a military coup against Thaksin 
and the Thai Rak Thai Party. This highlights that due to the historical allegiance to the 
King and the strength of the network monarchy, true civilian control over the military has 
been difficult. 
Secondly, Thailand’s history has been filled with military intervention in politics. 
In the modern era, there has never been a period of time in which the military has been 
removed from political affairs. While some interventions are through the form of military 
coups, others involve blurring the line between government and military with military 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 37. 
27 Ibid., 30.  
28 Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 
18, no. 4 (2005): 499–519. 
29 Ibid., 512.  
 11
leaders obtaining seats in parliament through election or appointment, becoming prime 
ministers following a coup, being appointed to key cabinet positions, organizing civilian 
militias, assisting with vote mechanics and security, maintaining an important role in 
economic development efforts, and obtaining legitimization for actions through its 
relationship with the monarchy.  
The failure to separate the military from government creates many problems with 
strengthening a democracy. Narcis Serra states: 
Coups are a symptom of a sick democracy. And, in politics, as in 
medicine, one must fight the illness and not just the symptoms. This 
means that the aim of military policy must be the inclusion of the military 
within the structure of the new democratic state. It implies establishing the 
armed forces’ relationship of dependency in respect of the government 
that is ‘normal’ in any consolidated democracy. Coups d’état will cease to 
be a threat to the extent that these policies are reinforced.30 
The challenge of gaining civilian control over the military within Thailand will not go 
away any time soon. However, based on Serra’s comments, without separation of the 
military from politics there is a strong that military autonomy will be preserved and the 
threat of a coup will remain. This has had, and will continue to have, a direct impact on 
the democratization of Thailand. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will conduct a comparative study of Thailand’s democratic process 
from 1992 to 2006 prior to the coup, and 2006 following the coup to 2011. This will be 
carried out through reviewing and analyzing the literature associated with these time 
frames found from scholars who write about democratic transitions and consolidations, 
civil-military relations, and Thai politics within the parliament, monarchy, and military. 
Primary sources within this thesis include the 1997 constitution and the 2007 
constitution. Both of these documents are available to the public in English. 
                                                 
30 Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, 30. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter II will discuss the elements of 
democratic transition and consolidation following the 1991 coup. The topics include the 
relationship between the monarchy and the parliament, influences of civil-military 
relations, and democratic reform efforts made by political leaders. The influences of the 
1997 Constitution, deemed the “People’s Constitution,” on Thai politics will also be 
presented in this chapter. This chapter will introduce the Privy Council and its 
relationship not only between the military and the King, but also its influence on 
democratic efforts within the parliament. The analysis of the interaction between these 
multiple actors will show a polarization within Thai politics being formed. Describing 
how Thai politics became increasingly polarized will elucidate the reasons attributed to 
the weakening of democracy. This chapter will also discuss the conditions leading up to 
the 2006 coup. Democratically elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, with the help 
of the 1997 constitution and his vast wealth, created a strong executive branch under his 
leadership, leading to high levels of corruption and an abuse of power within 
government. The network monarchy, losing its influence in Thai politics as Thaksin’s 
power grew, saw the rising democratic leader’s role in government as a threat to stability 
in Thailand. This resulted in a bloodless coup in 2006 which removed Thaksin and his 
Thai Rak Thai Party from power. 
Chapter III will discuss the results of the 2006 coup and the steps taken since then 
to stabilize Thailand’s democracy. The analysis of these steps will give multiple insights 
into the possibility of instability or stability in the future. This chapter will analyze the 
differences and similarities between the relationship of the monarchy, military and 
parliament prior to the coup and after. This chapter will also discuss the new constitution 
that was ratified after the coup and some of the differences and similarities it has with the 
1997 constitution. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the polarized conflict between the Red 
Shirts and Yellow Shirts and their impact on Thai politics.   
Chapter IV summarizes the findings and concludes whether or not they support 
the hypothesis, which is that polarization has caused political instability in Thailand 
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beginning shortly after Thaksin’s election in 2001. This chapter analyzes the prospect for 
future democratic stability in Thailand and the impact of the 2006 coup on possible future 
military interventions in Thai politics. The conclusion, based on the analysis of pre-2006 
coup democratic efforts and those made after the coup will shed light on the future of 











II. POLARIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
1992–2006 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s depicted a time in which many viewed Thai politics to be on the path 
toward gradual democratization. However, all of this changed in the first couple years in 
the 1990s. On February 23, 1991, General Chatichai Choonhavan was removed as prime 
minister in a military coup. In the following election, the military attempted to maintain 
power within government by self-appointing an Army general as prime minister. In 
response to the military’s overt attempt to control Thai politics, student-led protests broke 
out, leading to a crackdown by the military, which left 52 dead.31 In the 1992 election, 
many hoped that Thai politics would stabilize and that a more democratic form of 
government would be founded.  
The time period that followed, spanning from September 1992 to September 
2006, is generally characterized as a period in Thai history in which democratic 
institutions and ideals strengthened. The military made shifts toward accepting civilian 
control and a new constitution was created in 1997 that significantly assisted in the 
democratic consolidation process. However, despite these efforts, it will be apparent that 
Thai politics became increasingly divided between those in office and civil society who 
were attempting to create a more democratic form of government, and the network 
monarchy, led by General Prem Tinsulanond, which continued to maintain its traditional 
influence in politics to preserve their interests. Furthermore, Thai society became more 
divided between the Bangkok middle class, which sought clean democratic governments, 
and provincial voters, who were willing to sell their votes in exchange for populist 
changes. This evolving polarization, deepened by Prime Minister Thaksin in his populist 
efforts to challenge the establishment and consolidate his own power, led to mass 
protests, followed by a military coup in 2006 that removed him from office. 
                                                 
31 John Pike, “February 1991 Coup,” Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/coup-1991.htm. 
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B. FROM CHUAN TO THAKSIN 1992–2006 
1. 1992–1998: Slow, But Steady Progress in Democratization 
Thailand in the 1980s was put on a path by the Prem government of world-leading 
economic growth rates and gradual democratization, both of which were considered 
important strategies for ending Thailand’s communist insurgency. Rapid economic 
growth was achieved by improved market mechanisms that spurred double-digit annual 
growth rates in 1988 and 1989 and subsequently a larger middle class. The government’s 
export-led growth strategy starting in 1984 resulted in a 17.8 percent growth in exports in 
1985. Other economic changes included tighter budget ceilings, cautious external debt 
polities, tighter monetary and fiscal discipline, and increased efficiency in tax collection.  
Economic success initially added significantly to political stability led by General 
Prem who was appointed as prime minister in 1980. Over his eight years in office, Prem 
was noted for his personal integrity and ability to preserve a balance between military and 
political parties.32 During the 1980s two military coups failed, both attempting to reverse 
the democratization process and instill constitutions that would solidify the military’s role 
in politics. These attempted coups failed due to the support General Prem enjoyed from 
the palace and the military and the increasing strength of political parties within 
government.33  
As Thailand continued to grow economically, Prem’s administration was able to 
facilitate the development of democratic norms among the Bangkok middle class. As the 
1990s approached, prodemocracy groups increased their pressure for a more democratic 
form of government led by elected leaders. The elections in 1988 and 1992 demonstrated 
the increasing strength of elected politicians and the decline of influence by bureaucratic 
and military elites. Suchit Bunbongkarn states, “This development was possible because 
of the growing strength of civil society….The antimilitary and anti-Prem groups were 
more vocal in the 1988 election and gained more support from the urban-educated 
electorate, which believed that it was time for the military to step down and allow 
                                                 
32 Bunbongkarn, “Thailand’s Successful Reforms,” 55–56. 
33 Ibid. 
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parliament to determine who governed.”34 In 1988, General Prem declined to remain 
prime minister after the election, paving the way for an elected member of the house to 
be appointed prime minister − General Chatichai. 
General Chatichai was involved in money politics and widespread corruption 
during his term in office. Despite becoming popularly elected, corruption led to a decline 
in the government’s legitimacy. On February 23, 1991, Chatichai was arrested during a 
military coup and an interim government was formed under Anand Panyarachun at the 
request of the King and General Prem, now a member of the Privy Council. Anand’s 
interim government promised to create a new constitution and conduct parliamentary 
elections. On April 7, 1992, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the leader of the National 
Peace Keeping Council (NPKC), which conducted the coup d’état in 1991, was appointed 
as prime minister. Despite initial public support by the Bangkok middle class during the 
coup and the months that followed, when Suchinda made himself prime minister, public 
support of the military diminished. His self-appointment was widely seen as a desperate 
effort on the part of the military to retain power.35  
Student-led street protests erupted in Bangkok, and numbers eventually grew to 
over 200,000 by mid-May. The military responded by imposing curfews and deploying 
military personnel around the city. Between the 17th and 20th of May, the military reacted 
to the protests with a bloody crackdown, leaving 52 dead, hundreds of injuries, and over 
3,500 arrests.36 The military crackdown would later be known as the “Black May” 
massacre. King Bhumibol, in fear of a possible civil war, summoned Suchinda and 
General Srimuang, the leader of the pro-democracy movement, to a televised audience 
and urged them to end the conflict peacefully. Suchinda stepped down as prime minister 
days later and new general elections were held in September. 
The continued strength of antimilitary groups, consisting mainly of Bangkok 
middle class citizens, was evident in the March 1992 election and throughout the mass 
                                                 
34 Suchit Bunbongkarn, “Elections and Democratization in Thailand,” in The Politics of Elections in 
Southeast Asia, ed. R.H. Taylor (Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996.), 190. 
35 Bunbongkarn, “Thailand’s Successful Reforms,” 57. 
36 Pike, “February 1991 Coup.”  
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protests and crackdown by the military. In the second election that year, the so-called 
angel or prodemocracy parties, representing those who had participated in the antimilitary 
protests, were favored over the military-aligned parties under Suchinda. In September 
1992, Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat Party, was elected as prime minister. 
Chuan’s time in office is associated with multiple achievements that appeared to 
put Thailand back on the path of democratic consolidation. Chuan was a longtime leader 
of the Democrat Party and was known for his honest and moderate approach to politics. 
During his term in office, he experienced modest success in his efforts to strengthen 
democracy.37 One of the most important steps toward democratization was the 
administration’s effort to strengthen civilian control of the military. Following the events 
in “Black May,” the military lost legitimacy and was forced out of a predominantly overt 
role in politics. William Case states, “The military thus retreated humbly to the barracks, 
though it retained a compensatory presence in some key state enterprises and corporate 
boardrooms.”38 The actions conducted by the military during the 1991 coup and the 
attempts to maintain political control afterward were undemocratic in nature, which 
furthered the loss of their legitimacy.39 This gave the newly elected government the 
opportunity to pass several democratic changes to traditional civil-military relations 
without fear of intervention. 
Ironically, another reason for Chuan’s initial success with democratization was 
due to his relationship with the network monarchy. Network monarchy refers to the 
network-based politics and intervention into the political system by the monarchy and 
                                                 
37 Clark Neher, “Democratization in Thailand,” Asian Affairs 21, no. 4 (1995).  
38 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 
181. 
39 Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Indonesia, South 
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military.40 Following the direct approach to Thai politics that led to the military coup and 
the events during “Black May,” the network monarchy realized that it needed to refine 
how it would remain influential in Thai politics. No longer could it rely on the 
intervention of Thai politics through the use of its military via military coups. The 
solution was to work behind the scenes, with the administrations that were elected into 
power to help ensure that the network monarchy’s interests were achieved. This plan was 
conducted by General Prem, leader of the network monarchy, through his ability to create 
a working relationship with Chuan during his election campaign before he became prime 
minister. In a 1993 article in Naeo Na, the relationship between Prem and Chuan is 
described: 
Even if there is no formal disclosure, everyone can observe General Prem 
Tinsulanond….Because if we look closely, from the time when Chuan’s 
government came into office, Prem has been an important person to whom 
the Democrat Party pays respect and constantly asks advice.41 
Duncan McCargo claims that, in the view of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the core 
achievement of the network monarchy lay in securing a high degree of relative autonomy 
for the monarchy within Thailand’s increasingly pluralist order.42 Through Prem as a 
proxy, the monarchy was able to maintain its grasp on Thai politics through its working 
relationship with Chuan and the Democrat Party. The military was also able to maintain 
relative autonomy. While the military publicly pledged its support to democratically 
elected governments, military elites saw Prem as the link to political elites and party 
leaders. The military was also still able to defend its political and institutional autonomy 
                                                 
40 Duncan McCargo defines the main features of the network monarchy from 1980 to 2001 as follows: 
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promotions.” 
41 McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” 509. 
42 Ibid., 501. 
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through its continued representation of active-duty officers within the Senate.43 Overall, 
the relationship between Prem, the monarchy, the military, and the Democrat Party 
ensured that despite the strengthening of democracy in Thai politics, they could maintain 
enough influence to preserve their institutional autonomy. 
The Chuan administration also maintained support from the monarchy, military, 
and civilian population in large part due to a high economic growth rate in the early 
1990s. Due to the rise of people’s standard of living, Thai citizens remained supportive of 
the government, giving Chuan’s administration a “cushion” to make important changes 
for Thailand.44 The administration developed many key policies to include: an emphasis 
on national economic stability, decentralization of the administrative powers to the rural 
provinces, fostering income growth, and opportunity and economic development 
distribution to the regions. 
Political stability was also enhanced due to the new international era in which no 
outside powers threatened Thai sovereignty and no internal insurgency risked domestic 
stability. These elements mitigated the military’s possible motivation to intervene in Thai 
politics by staging another coup. With the military considerably less involved in politics, 
the Chuan government could focus on the continued democratic consolidation of the 
state. Further advancements in democratization included constitutional amendments that 
provided for more wide-ranging democratic practices, enlargement of the House of 
Representatives, reducing the size of the appointed Senate, lowering of the voting age 
from 20 to 18 years of age, passing of reforms that improved equality for women, and 
establishment of an administrative court.45 
Evidence of other pro-democratic elements was found in civil society’s 
relationship with the Chuan administration. Specific organizations were established to 
voice the opinions and requests of those in middle and lower classes with the expectation 
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that the government would listen and respond. The “Assembly of the Poor,” a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), prided itself on organizing rural villagers in the 
northeast to more effectively connect specific local grievances to national government 
policies. Newly formed civil society organizations that were formed around issues of 
environmental problems, economic and social injustice, inequity in the distribution of 
land for agricultural use, and unbalanced development. By creating a link between 
policies created by the government, and the opinions of the citizens being affected by 
them, there were greater chances for more effective programs to be drafted and 
implemented.46 
However, despite new relationships between NGOs and the government, the rise 
of Chuan into power also depicts a growing divide between Bangkok’s middle class and 
lower class provincial voters. Elections are important for a democracy due to the 
institutionalization of mass participation in the governing process. Since 1932, voter 
turnout has been increasing, averaging approximately 60 percent in the 1986, 1988, 1992 
general elections. However, the increasing importance of Thai society in politics has also 
created a gap between “democratic idealism and actual practices.”47 There is a divide 
between Bangkok middle class citizens, who generally have a higher level of political 
awareness and knowledge, and lower class provincial citizens who tend to have a lower 
level of political awareness, knowledge, and alternatives. People with more education, 
higher incomes, and white-collar or professional occupations tend to be more politically 
aware and tend to understand better how to influence the government. Among these types 
of citizens voter turnout is argued to be higher than lower class citizens when looking at 
other democracies.48 What makes Thailand unique in this sense is that voter turnout by 
middle class citizens in Bangkok, the most highly developed and most modern city of the 
Kingdom, is lowest when compared to rates in the rest of the country. There has been an 
increasing trend of higher voter turnouts in the less politically aware lower class 
provinces.  
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Voter turnout in Thailand’s less developed rural provinces has been increasing 
due to the mobilization activities of politicians in their areas, especially by a new class of 
politician: recently wealthy business leaders. Due to their low level of education, political 
awareness, and income, rural voters may be more easily incentivized in how they vote by 
local leaders, influential candidates, political parties, or government officials.49 Evidence 
can be found from elections starting in 1983 in which the Ministry of Interior instructed 
district officers to encourage voters to cast ballots in return for a set reward for the district 
with the highest turnout. Other evidence can be found in the form of increased vote 
buying. Rather than seen as a nondemocratic practice as perceived by the Bangkok 
middle class, these lower class voters do not see vote buying as a bribe. Rather they often 
reason, “What we have received is like getting some modest gifts upon purchasing 
quality merchandise.”50 Lastly, mobilization is increased by the connection between the 
candidate and the local province. According to Anek Laothamatas: 
Most recent studies find that [rural] voters pick politicians who visit them 
regularly; who help them cope with difficult personal or family 
problems...who regularly attend social functions at the village level; who 
make generous donations to neighborhood monasteries or schools; and 
who bring in public programs that generate jobs, money, and reputation 
for their villages and provinces.51 
This means that rural voters tend to care less about the election platform of the 
candidates, their party affiliation, or their integrity as members of the house or of the 
cabinet. 
In contrast, Bangkok voters tend to vote more for a party than for individuals, 
where the party attachment of the candidates, party policies and ideology, and national 
and international issues are considered.52 Bangkok’s middle class voters are not as 
materially dependent upon their politicians and thus when they vote they do so on the 
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basis of their values and interests. They usually do not need the small amounts of money 
that could come from vote buying, thus strengthening their commitment to free and fair 
elections. Despite these independent voters in Bangkok being politically aware, voter 
turnout there has remained relatively low. While many Bangkok voters believe that they 
participate in elections because it is their responsibility to do so as a citizen, most argue 
that, despite voting, they have not had an impact on choosing the government in previous 
elections. An increase in voting by those in the provinces where 70 percent of the 
population resided was decreasing the influence traditionally held by those in Bangkok. 
Despite the progressive reforms that the Chuan administration was making, from 
1992 to 1995 the prime minister was highly criticized by competing political parties and 
Thai citizens over a land reform project that was allegedly rife with corruption. New 
evidence found in a government document named “Sor.Por.Kor. 4–01” illuminated not 
only the progress of the land reform program, but it also showed that several wealthy 
Thai families on the resort island of Phuket had benefited from the governmental land 
reform program that was intended to redistribute land to poor farmers.53 Given that 
Chuan had consistently insisted on honesty and integrity in government, the scandal was 
seen by the Bangkok middle class and press as an “intolerable betrayal.”54 While Chuan 
was never found to be directly involved in the scandal, he faced a no-confidence vote in 
parliament following Deputy Prime Minister Chamlong Srimuang’s announcement of his 
party’s withdrawal from the five-party coalition government. Following an 
announcement of a future snap election, Chuan stated, “Therefore the best way [to 
resolve the recent events] is to return power to the people and let them consider what is 
best.”55 The parliament was officially dissolved on May 19, 1995. 
Two months later, a general election was held and Mr. Banharn Silpa-archa, Thai 
Nation Party Leader, was appointed prime minister. While Banharn was only in power 
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for a year, some academics evaluate his time in office as a step backward for 
democracy.56 They compared Banharn to the elected government of Chatichai 
Choonhavan that was ousted by a bloodless coup in February 1991 on allegations of 
corrupt practices.57 Many of the same members of Chatichai’s government reappeared in 
ministerial positions under Banharn. Throughout the election period prior to becoming 
prime minister, Banharn’s party was accused of buying votes to ensure its victory. Some 
reports show that a whole village was being bought for between 100,000 and 200,000 
baht (US$4,000 to $8,000).58 The PollWatch organization, which had overseen the past 
two elections, reported that it received 2,268 election-related complaints. Despite the 
police arresting 106 people for vote buying, the bureaucracy and PollWatch officials 
were unable to ensure a clean election. While the election did occur, resulting in Banharn 
as prime minister, a large portion of the public considered him corrupt, which led to the 
weakening of his administration’s legitimacy from the start of his term. 
With Banharn in charge, the divide deepened. For the lower class citizens in 
provinces around the country, Banharn was the better political candidate when compared 
to the Democrat Party that had not delivered as fully as they would have liked when it 
came to land reform. Bangkok middle class citizens, on the other hand, viewed the 
Banharn government as nondemocratic, since it came into power through vote buying. 
Furthermore, continued allegations of corruption added to their view that the Banharn 
government could not be seen as trustworthy or legitimate. The Nation newspaper 
following the election reported, “The clock has been set backwards for Thai democracy 
with the reemergence of the old-style politicians.”59 This view was shared by the 
monarchy. Following the announcement of the members of Banharn’s cabinet, it was 
clear that most appointments were based on reward for loyalty and financial contributions 
rather than capability, honesty, or experience. During the swearing-in ceremony, the King 
told the ministers, “You have become ministers legitimately, so now you must work to 
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keep legitimacy. This means your work must be legally and morally right.”60 Not 
surprisingly, this did not happen. During the month of August, the King appeared on 
television almost nightly to denounce the country’s politicians for their venality and self-
interest. 
While it was clear that the monarchy did not support Banharn, it was unable to 
prevent him from becoming elected. This highlighted that the monarchy might be losing 
its influence in Thai politics. Duncan McCargo states, “The rise of Banharn demonstrated 
that the monarchy lacked the power to block such politicians from becoming prime 
minister. Nevertheless, the monarchy did not hesitate to undermine elected prime 
ministers of whom it disapproved.”61 Banharn’s administration did not stay in power 
long. On September 27, 1996, Bunharn left office when concordance in his 
administration had diminished as a result of multiple corruption scandals that had 
occurred during his term. One corruption scandal gave him the nickname of “Mr. ATM” 
when he was accused of being a politician who dispensed dirty money under the table to 
those who requested it.62 
Two months later, elections were again held and retired general Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh was appointed prime minister. Repeating the corrupt practices that 
occurred before, this election was also infected with vote buying. Reports from The New 
York Times found entire polling stations were being bought for 80,000 to 100,000 baht 
(US$3,200 to $4,000). It seemed that direct payoffs to voters were becoming a more 
prominent part of election campaigns in Thailand. Mechai Viravaidya, a former 
government minister stated, “I call it commercial democracy, the purchased mandate. We 
have applied capitalism to everything, including democracy.”63 Despite many claims of 
an unfair election, Chavalit was appointed prime minister. 
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The Chavalit government took control of a country that had been on a steep 
economic rise for the past eight years and a steady increase since the early 1980s, but all 
of that changed a few short months later. Thailand’s real gross domestic product (GDP) 
had grown by 8–13 percent per year between 1987 and 1995, one of the fastest growth 
rates in the world. Thailand’s economic growth would decline markedly with the Asian 
financial crisis that began in July 1997. Thailand’s crisis began when the combination of 
its recent success, high domestic interest rates and fixed exchange rates led to 
destabilizing inflows of short-term capital. This occurred after Thailand liberalized its 
capital account and set up an international banking center in Bangkok. According to 
Jonathan Leightner, these short-term capital inflows helped Thailand’s banks but hurt its 
finance and securities companies. He states, “When Thailand’s finance and securities 
companies started to fail, international expectations plummeted, short-term capital 
inflows dried up, and Thailand was forced to float its currency,” bringing with it a sharp 
devaluation of the Thai baht.64 
In an attempt to help the country rebound from its economic downfall, Chavalit 
made several promises to banks, businesses and investors. On August 19, 1997, Thailand 
accepted US$17.2 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
The IMF imposed strict conditions on Thailand receiving the money, to include the 
country agreeing to restructure its financial sector and to not rescue any more of its 
financial institutions. Other conditions included a one baht per liter tax on oil products. 
The currency devaluation and many of the IMF-imposed conditions were painful for 
Thais from all walks of life; however, those at the lowest end of the economic spectrum 
were least able to absorb the shock. After a time, most Thai citizens did not believe that 
the economy was improving. With Thais losing faith in the prime minister’s ability to 
turn the country’s economy around, the finance minister suddenly resigned. Chavalit, a 
former army general, enjoyed close relations with the military, and the military seemed to 
try to head off political instability by initially backing his government during the 
economic crisis. Despite this, Chavalit’s inability to effectively tackle the economic 
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problems eventually led to the military’s support of his resignation.65 One month later, on 
November 3, 1997, Chavalit resigned.66  
Despite the economic crisis and subsequent downfall of Chavalit, under his 
administration a new “People’s Constitution” was ratified. Scholars believe that the 
financial crisis created the urgency to draft and pass a new constitution capable of 
reforming Thai politics in a way that could help create stability. Amy Freedman states, 
“There is no question that the financial crisis of July 1997 served as a catalyst for the 
passage of the new constitution. Afraid of further political chaos, domestic and 
international investors withdrew until they felt reassured that political reforms would go 
forward and that politics would stabilize….”67 The events associated with the economic 
crisis gave way to the discrediting of old ways of conducting business and politics in 
Thailand, giving importance to the passing of a new constitution that could create a new 
political system. 
2. The 1997 “People’s Constitution” 
Eighteen constitutions have been passed since 1932 in Thailand. The majority of 
these constitutions have been drafted and ratified under military control. Since the 
country became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, a vicious cycle of elections, 
instability, and military coups has led to political elites in power using constitutional 
reform to legitimize whatever regime they put in place, even if the changes were 
insignificant. In the early 1990s, the gradual opening of democracy eventually led to the 
drafting of a new constitution through a more inclusive process that sought to alter the 
governance system in terms of executive stability, accountability and participation.68 
While many Thai citizens and governmental officials expected a constitution to be 
created shortly after the first election following the coup, it was not drafted and passed 
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until 1997. Bjorn Dressel states, “Dissatisfaction with the poor functioning of Thai 
democracy and the rise of money-based electoral politics underpinned the demands for 
constitutional reform in the 1990s; there was a sense that the reform process had been 
stalled in Parliament by traditional interests and self-interested politicians.”69 The entire 
country was becoming more politically educated and aware. 
On October 11, 1997, a new constitution, known to Thais as “The People’s 
Constitution,” was ratified. While many years in the making, the document was drafted 
by a 99-person elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) over a period of eight 
months. It was the first of its kind in Thai history to reflect extensive public consultation, 
which was encouraged and facilitated by the King. Thai media aired numerous television 
talk shows and public fora in an effort to obtain public opinions and inputs on what 
should be contained within the new constitution. According to the CDA’s Public Opinion 
and Public Hearing Committee, over 850,000 people were consulted throughout the 
country and more than 300 organizations participated in the drafting process.70 Overall, 
the new constitution according to Suchitra Punyaratabandhu represented a “victory of 
democracy groups over supporters of the old political system based on clique politics.”71 
One of the top public responses when asked about what should change within 
Thai politics was the influence of money. Money politics had become the root of many 
problems in Thai politics such as the fragmented party system, endemic corruption, and 
unstable governing coalitions.72 The weak party system stemmed from the common 
struggle of political elites attempting to gain more wealth and power. Suchit 
Bunbongkarn states that, “In most of the major parties, businessmen-turned-politicians 
who provide financial support always demand top posts and cabinet seats…since they  
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spend so much money to be elected, political leaders feel they have to seize any 
opportunity to ‘recoup their investment.’”73 This undoubtedly led to increased corruption 
within the Thai government. 
Several of the provisions of the 1997 constitution were designed to create a party 
system that would significantly lessen corruption and vote-buying. This, in part, was 
accomplished through the creation and strengthening of monitoring systems. The 
constitution mandated three new, independent bodies that would help provide a strong 
system of checks-and-balances.74 Through the Election Commission (EC), all elections, 
at the national and local level would be monitored by the EC and civil society for election 
fraud. This would not only help decrease overall complaints about fraud, but would also 
serve to legitimize the election period and the new party and leader taking office. The 
five-member EC was also given the authority to annul the results of elections where fraud 
or other abuses were confirmed and call new ones. The second agency created was the 
National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC). Composed of nine members, the 
NCCC replaced the former, less independent Counter-Corruption Committee, which was 
known to be prone to political influence. The NCCC would be responsible for 
investigating corruption petitions and prosecuting those that were known to be corrupt. 
Finally, the third agency, the Constitutional Court, would conduct rulings on the 
constitutionality of actions and laws, thus promoting rule of law, a key component of a 
strong democracy.75 
Another area of reform focused on the institutional structure of the Thai 
government. The primary goal was to ensure that governments would have significantly 
greater stability and staying power. This was achieved by weakening the ties between the 
executive and legislative branches, paired with the institutionalization of political 
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parties.76 In an effort to encourage party cohesion and greater voter equality, the number 
of seats in the House of Representatives was increased from 392 to 500, with 400 of these 
elected from single-member districts.77 The other 100 members would be elected under a 
party-list system in a single national constituency. The constitution also introduced a 
fully elected Senate, differing from the traditional system by which senators were 
appointed by the prime minister. Lastly, the new constitution also changed many 
elements of the party system. The constitution maintained the requirement of party 
membership for candidates. Parties that receive fewer than five percent of the party-list 
votes receive no list tier seats. Party switching was also tightened, requiring that a 
candidate be a confirmed member of a political party for at least 90 days prior to an 
election in order to be eligible to run. Lastly, members of parliament who serve in a 
cabinet position were required to surrender their seats in the House.78 
The constitution also had an impact on the military. Following the events of 1991, 
military representation in the senate began to decline. While it was clear that the military 
was becoming less directly involved in politics and beginning to professionalize, it had 
always maintained a small representation of active or retired military within the senate. 
However, under the new constitution, senators had to be elected rather than appointed by 
the prime minister. Military appointees had begun to drop in the 1990s, decreasing from 
154 out of 270 senators (57 percent of seats) from 1992–1996, to 48 out of 260 senators 
(18 percent of seats) between 1996–2000. These numbers represent a 39 percent drop in 
military-appointed senate seats and, importantly, eliminate the military’s majority in this 
legislative body. By the first election under the 1997 constitution in 2001, only two 
percent of new senators were ex-military. These numbers represent the notion that 
military presence in the government, while traditionally strong, was beginning to 
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decrease in the 1990s.79 Furthermore, despite the possibility of being elected, military 
leaders were not the most popularly supported when compared to the civilian candidates. 
3. Chuan’s Second Term  
Chuan Leekpai was the first prime minister to serve under the new constitution. 
While elections under the new constitution did not occur until 2001, Chuan was in charge 
of carrying out the changes laid out in the constitution. Following Chavalit’s resignation 
on November 3, 1997, Chuan was re-appointed as prime minister just seven days later. 
He returned to power without an election, due to what some believe was the result of a 
backroom deal. Some speculate that the deal had Prem’s fingerprints on it in order to 
ensure that an administration was put in power that was deemed acceptable by the 
network monarchy.80 While Chuan was remembered as corrupt and untrustworthy due to 
the land reform scandal during his previous term, the network monarchy saw Chuan as 
the most acceptable choice as prime minister due to his traditional allegiance to the 
monarchy, continued relationship with Prem, and earlier reputation as a relatively clean 
politician. 
Still, a topic of concern for the government and the citizens was the continued 
downward spiral of Thailand’s economy. The new Chuan government needed to prove to 
its citizens that democracy could cope with an economic crisis and a military takeover 
was not the answer. The baht was still unstable and there was tremendous outflow of 
capital. Due to this the government had to allow high interest rates to bring down 
inflation. The government’s budget was cut also in hopes of reining in inflation. The 
military was one of the areas cut during the economic crisis. The Chuan administration 
made it clear that the government was in arrears and that both civilian and military 
bureaucracies had no choice but to cut spending.  
While the largest attention to budget cuts to the military was recognized during 
this period, decreases in its budget had been occurring since 1992. Army Commander 
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General Wimol Wongwanich, following the aftermath of the 1992 “Black May” 
massacre, reluctantly agreed to a defense budget reduction for fiscal year 1993–1994.81 
Prior to 1992, debates related to the military budget were minimal, and budgets were 
usually approved with little change. The declining military budget continued through the 
mid-1990s and dropped to its lowest level during the financial crisis in 1997.82 Although 
changes did occur for the fiscal year 1993–1994, it was not until the economic crisis 
occurred did the military have to defend the allocation of their budget to civilian leaders. 
Chuan, while holding the position of prime minister and defense minister at the same 
time, was able to convince the military leaders to set an example by allowing defense cuts 
at least equal to the average of other ministries. This was met with little resistance, as 
most of the cuts were aimed at reducing the size of the military, a task many military 
officers had been attempting to do for some time. Furthermore, as the military decreased 
in size, leaders anticipated that there would be more room for weapon modernization 
following the economic crisis. Other budget cuts included combat allowance amounts, 
decreases in military attaché positions, and proceeds made by military-owned radio and 
television stations.83 The lack of heavy resistance to civilian oversight over the defense 
budget signaled to many that the military was not only professionalizing, but recognizing 
a new role of defending political stability during an economic crisis by setting the 
example of following democratic leader’s decisions.  
By the end of 1998, the baht had stabilized at a rate of 36 to the U.S. dollar (in 
January of that year, it had been as low as 56 to the dollar), and interest rates had fallen 
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from 20 to 11 percent.84 While these numbers show that the economy was changing for 
the better, the economic recovery was slow. Support for the government among the 
Bangkok middle class remained stable. Many feared that if the Chavalit government had 
remained in power, the country would have gone into an even deeper economic malaise 
and believed that Chuan’s administration provided more competent people to deal with 
the country’s economic problems. However, many rural low-income Thais did not find 
the Chuan administration’s performance acceptable. Many believed that the government 
was paying too much attention to the economic crisis, which hit banks and real estate 
owners especially hard, and not enough attention to the ongoing problems associated with 
the poor and rural provinces. Many small and medium-sized businesses went under in 
1998, since few Thais felt safe spending or investing. Furthermore, unemployment 
continued to rise. Over the next year and a half, Chuan continued to pass reforms that 
helped improve Thailand’s economy. However it was evident that despite small 
improvements, it would take several years to recover from the crisis. 
Meanwhile, corruption scandals, again, surrounded Chuan during his term in 
office. While allegations, like last time, did not involve Chuan directly, his administration 
was tainted. On a positive note, the results of these scandals showed progress in 
institutional reforms made under the new constitution that aimed at keeping the 
government accountable. Within the Public Health Ministry, accusations made by the 
Rural Doctors Society concerned government purchase of drugs and equipment at 
inflated prices. After a three-month investigation, the newly formed National Counter-
Corruption Commission concluded that corruption did exist, leading to the resignations of 
the Minister of Public Health and the Deputy Prime Minister. In another case, 
irregularities in the purchase of seeds in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives led 
to the resignation of another Deputy Prime Minister. Both of these corruption scandals 
showed that traditional Thai politics, which usually was surrounded with corruption, 
would not be acceptable under the new constitution.  
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4. The Rise of Thaksin Shinawatra 
In November 2000, the Democrat-led government dissolved Parliament within the 
timeframe specified by the new Constitution.85 The subsequent polls held in January 
2001 marked the first elections to be held under the new constitution. Overall, the 
constitution brought about many of the changes the framers had sought. Most 
importantly, it sharply reduced the number of political parties represented in parliament. 
In the past about 43 parties competed for seats in parliament, which meant governments 
had to rely on shaky coalitions to remain in power. These often required repayment 
through choice appointments that provided opportunities for graft. Constitutional 
reformers viewed this as a source of instability and illegitimacy.  
As a result of the changes they instituted, only 10 parties were left to compete in 
the elections in 2001.86 One party nearly secured an outright majority. The Thai Rak Thai 
Party (TRT [Thais Love Thailand]), previously a small party, won 248 out of 500 seats. 
More importantly, several smaller parties formed a coalition with TRT that enabled its 
leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, to become the first prime minister ever to serve a full term in 
office. In that way, constitutional reforms had clearly succeeded – by reducing the 
number of parties, they had increased political stability. 
The success of Thaksin Shinawatra and his TRT Party during the election was 
primarily based on securing the populist vote received from many poor Thai citizens.87 
While vote buying continued, putting baht immediately into the pockets of rural Thais, 
many provincial voters were attracted by Thaksin’s proposed politics, especially in 
contrast to what they had received from the government in the past. During the TRT 
election campaign, Thaksin made many promises to pass specific policy initiatives that 
would help lower class Thais. For example, he promised Thai voters that he would pledge 
to charge just thirty baht88 for a visit to a public hospital; to provide each village a 
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microcredit fund of one million baht; and to give farmers a three-year moratorium on 
debt payments.89 One of the reasons for his continued public support after taking office 
was due to the actual fulfillment of these pledges. Other policy initiatives included 
bureaucratic reforms aimed at improving customer service and accountability, 
decentralization and local elections, social welfare politics aimed at Thailand’s rural 
poor, and a campaign against illegal drugs.90 
While much of the rural, low-income public supported Thaksin as prime minister, 
the monarchy and military did not. Thaksin, with the support of his TRT Party within 
parliament and constitutional changes that empowered the executive branch, was able to 
push multiple initiatives through parliament and the bureaucracy with little resistance. 
Furthermore, Thaksin used his political power to pass many initiatives that were not 
supported by the network monarchy. Duncan McCargo summarizes Thaksin’s changes: 
Thaksin set about systematically to dismantle the political networks loyal 
to Prem in a wide range of sectors, aiming to replace them with his own 
supporters, associates and relatives. Thaksin was seeking to subvert 
network monarchy, and to replace it with a political economy network…a 
network based on insider dealing and structural corruption.91 
Thaksin also capitalized on a widespread Thai sentiment that the political elite, which he 
disingenuously claimed not to be a part of, was responsible for their suffering during the 
financial crisis and through deals made with the IMF. As Thaksin’s power grew, the 
network monarchy could do little but watch the changes occur. 
One of the changes he made was the dismantling of many Army-led security 
structures tasked with fighting the southern insurgency, such as the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Centre which had been created by Prem in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, Thaksin chose to replace the military with the police in the restive southern 
provinces, stating that the old insurgency had degenerated into mere banditry.92 Thaksin, 
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a former policeman himself, knew that if he kept the support of the police, he could use 
them as a way to prevent a possible military coup in the future.93 He also employed the 
police in 2003 as a way to wage a “war on drugs” that led to at least 2,300 extrajudicial 
killings.94 Other changes included becoming involved in the military promotion system, 
thus elevating trusted associates such the promotion of his cousin as commander-in-chief 
of the army, ahead of others in line or considered more qualified.95 Paul Handley states,  
During 2004–5, Thaksin appeared to reject criticism from the king and 
Prem over the government’s brutal crackdown on Muslim dissent in 
southern Thailand…Thaksin also appeared to defeat the king and Prem in 
a battle of wills over filling top military and government positions. The 
palace seemed increasingly anguished and hostile over Thaksin’s eclipse 
of royal power and prerogative.96 
The reach of Thaksin’s power was evident to the network monarchy: while it had 
the power to help oust prime ministers in the past who were not supported by the 
monarchy, such as Banharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Thaksin was just 
too strong. This proved to be a great threat to the traditional role of the network 
monarchy. Forced to work with a prime minister whose power was unprecedented, the 
network monarchy realized not only did it have to pick its challenges carefully, but as 
Thaksin’s political system strengthened, the network monarchy would have to find a way 
to survive.97 
For the first time in Thai history, a prime minister had served his full term in 
office, and in the 2005 election, Thaksin and his TRT Party won in a landslide victory. 
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Spectators began asking not only if Thaksin would complete another full term, but how 
many terms in office he would serve.98 The election outcome was the largest margin of 
victory in Thailand’s history, with the TRT Party obtaining 377 out of the 500 
parliamentary seats, a clear majority even before coalition deals were brokered. It seemed 
that the influence of the changes made by the 1997 constitution to reduce the number of 
competing parties found in the traditional fragmented parliamentary system had worked. 
Aurel Croissant states:  
The trend is from highly fragmented individual political parties towards 
deepening polarization between two larger political parties with different 
political platforms and clearly distinguished groups of voters. While the 
2001 election  intensified this development, the 2005 election has 
consolidated it.99 
The effects of the 1997 constitution decreased the number of parties competing in an 
election from 43 to 10 by the 2001 election.100 By the 2005 election, the number of 
overall parties that had a realistic chance of winning seats had decreased to four.101 
Following the 2005 election, serious concerns arose that the Thaksin regime had 
begun to erode the mechanisms and principles of democracy even as they had jettisoned 
him to power. Opposition politicians, academics, journalists, and middle-class 
Bangkokians began to wonder if Thaksin had been undermining democratic elements in 
order to consolidate and maintain power. Suspicions were confirmed when members of 
Thaksin’s family sold Shin Corporation, their flagship company, for $1.9 billion tax 
free.102 The newly formed civil society-opposition group, The People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), began protesting against Thaksin’s administration. Most members of 
the PAD were Bangkok middle class citizens, who believed in democratic ideals and the 
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traditional patriarchic role of the monarchy in Thai politics. Identified by their bright 
yellow shirts symbolizing the color of the monarchy, they accused the prime minister of 
abuse of power, insulting the monarchy, policy corruption favoring sectional interests, 
human rights abuses, and interference in the independent agencies of the state.103 As 
opposition spread around the country and protests grew within Bangkok, at the end of 
February Thaksin called for snap elections to be held on April 2, 2006. 
The snap elections were an attempt to shore up his legitimacy by demonstrating 
once again that a strong majority of Thais wished him still to be prime minister. While 
anti-Thaksin sentiment was strong in the capital city and southern Thailand, Thaksin had 
tremendous support from the poor majority who lived in rural areas in the north and 
northeast. Opposition parties, led by the Democrat Party, attempted to block Thaksin’s 
reelection by boycotting the election and encouraging voters across the country to select 
the “no vote” option.104 The Democrat Party also called on Thaksin to resign so that a 
new royally appointed government could temporarily assume office to initiate a round of 
political reforms.105 Post-election evidence emerged that showed the TRT Party provided 
support to small parties to ensure competition, causing a complaint to be filed with the 
Election Commission by a leader of the Democrat Party.106  
King Bhumibol, under pressure to intervene, called on the courts to examine the 
matter further, stating that the recent events were not in accordance with democracy.107 
In May, the election was annulled by the Constitutional Court. Tensions heightened 
shortly thereafter, as many Thais wondered how the next set of elections would be 
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conducted. Many in the military, monarchy, PAD, and Democrat Party claimed Thaksin’s 
refusal to step down after the elections were invalidated was reason enough to demand 
his removal. They also feared that Thaksin could win the majority once more. It was clear 
that there was a polarization in Thai politics beginning to deepen between those for and 
those against Thaksin’s continued power in government. 
5. The 2006 Military Coup d’état  
After 14 years of democratic consolidation, the return of the military to overt 
politics occurred with a bloodless coup on September 19, 2006. Reasons for the coup 
included, “Thaksin’s meddling with democratic institutions, his unprecedented 
polarization of society, his actions bordering on lese majeste, and his corrupt 
behavior.”108 According to Federico Ferrara, the military stepped in, “not merely to 
unseat Thaksin, but perhaps especially to lay the groundwork for his prosecution, 
confiscate his assets, dismantle those provisions in the 1997 constitution that protected 
his dominance, and put new safeguards in place against his return.”109 The military 
claimed that Thaksin’s caretaker government was planning a bloody crackdown on the 
PAD during the scheduled rally the next day. 
This event highlights a new peak of polarization within Thai politics. While 
polarization had been forming in the 1990s, the rise of Thaksin, paired with the way he 
challenged traditional Thai politics and new democratic institutions, resulted in an even 
stronger divide.110 While the military had been losing its traditional role in politics, the 
network monarchy, led by Prem, was able to ensure that military and royal interests were 
heard and supported by the government. Throughout Thaksin’s term he challenged the 
traditional role of the network monarchy, resulting in the military becoming involved in 
politics again through a coup. As the PAD protested in Bangkok, the military saw a way 
to act under the legitimacy of the monarchy to remove Thaksin from power. This is 
                                                 
108 Kuhonta, “The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 ‘People’s Constitution’: Be Careful What You Wish 
For,” 374. 
109 Ferrara, “Thailand: Minimally Stable, Minimally Democratic,” 524. 
110 Some claim that polarization was evident with the communist insurgency, which had supports in 
the student-led pro-democracy movement and among the rural poor. Both entered contentious politics with 
violent and nonviolent protest in the 1970s. 
 40
supported by a speech Prem gave to cadets at the military academy in which he stated 
that the military pledges its allegiance to the King, not the government. It was clear that a 
divide was forming with Thaksin as the catalyst. On one side were the TRTs, Thaksin, 
the police, and his populist support from Thais in the low-income provinces of the north 
and northeast; on the other side were the military, monarchy, and the PAD, who 
represented most of the Bangkok middle and upper class. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Reflecting over the period between 1992 and 2006, while democratic 
consolidation seemed evident in Thailand, this period actually reflects the weakening of 
democratic institutions and values. In 1992, Freedom House rated Thailand as “Partly 
Free” and continued to do so until the passing of the 1997 constitution, which boosted the 
country in 1998 to be rated as “Free.”111 Thailand continued to be rated as “Free” until 
2005 when political instability arose following the election of Thaksin to his second term 
as prime minister. However, these ratings fail to register the rising political instability, 
vote buying, continued corruption, extrajudicial killings, media control, and manipulation 
of the courts and monitoring bodies between 2001–2005. The polarization contributed to 
the weakening, not the consolidation, of democracy within Thailand during this period. 
Furthermore, despite the positive ratings being associated with the passing of a new 
democratic constitution, many academics argue that the constitution actually laid the 
foundations for an eventual military coup and subsequently the downgrading.112 
Constitutional reforms were intended to increase political stability by reforming 
many elements within the Thai government. The traditionally fragmented parliamentary 
system was replaced by new rules that incentivized political parties to merge. 
Furthermore, new institutions were created to provide more accountability in hopes of 
creating a strong checks-and-balances system. Lastly, under the new constitution senators 
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would be required to be elected rather than appointed. The result of this change was the 
continued decrease in military senate seats. 
Civil-military relations also changed during this period. The military, while their 
traditional participation in politics continued to decline, supported the passing of a 
democratic constitution. In 1998, Army Chief General Chetta Thanajaro reaffirmed the 
military’s commitment to supporting democracy stating, “The coup d’état is outdated. 
The more time passes, the more it’s obsolete…soldiers must stay completely away from 
politics – no involvement in the formation of governments, no criticism.”113 Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija claims that the military had to make fundamental changes in the way it 
operated within Thai politics, stating, “As long as parliamentary democracy continues to 
provide the formal rules of the political game and conventional coup-making is therefore 
less feasible, military leaders and their cliques have to realign themselves with the leaders 
of political parties, and be seen to be non-political or, at least, non-partisan.”114  
However, the military’s view of coups would eventually shift back to pre-1991 
days by the mid-2000s. The first election under the new constitution in 2001 brought to 
power, with the help of the post-financial crisis hangover, the TRT Party. This newly 
formed party was the most successful at absorbing many small parties that had the 
possibility of not surviving the first round of elections under the new constitution. This 
led to the TRT becoming the majority within the parliament and, resultantly, strengthened 
Thaksin’s power within government. While challenged by traditional political and 
military elites, his power was too strong for many to maintain their traditional role in 
Thai politics. At the height of his power during the 2005 elections, the network 
monarchy, supported by the Democrat Party and the newly formed PAD, sought to rid 
Thaksin of his control within the government. 
These divides depict the sharp deepening of political polarization within Thailand 
that had been forming since 1992. Following the 1991 coup and the “Black May” 
massacre, the military lost its legitimacy in Thai politics. Resultantly, they looked to 
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retired General Prem as a way to maintain their institutional autonomy. Prem, as head of 
the monarchy’s Privy Council, was able to represent the network monarchy through his 
relationship with prime ministers and the King. Members of the Democrat Party were 
usually supportive of the King, leading Prem to develop bonds with Chuan and ensure 
that the monarchy’s and military’s interests were met in Thai politics. Prime ministers 
who were not members of the Democrat Party, such as Banharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, faced a more difficult time in office and only lasted a year or two.  
Thai society during this time period was also becoming polarized. It is clear that 
on one side was the Bangkok middle class, which wanted a strong democratic 
government, which also would preserve the role of the monarchy, and, on the other side, 
Thais in the low-income provinces who appreciated the populist changes Thaksin’s 
government offered. Throughout the elections in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is apparent 
that the role of the Thai citizen in government decisions was increasing. Furthermore, the 
1997 constitution aimed at having more public input into new laws and procedures within 
the Thai government, something that had never happened in Thai history. Changes to the 
government included more elected leaders and fewer appointed ones. Throughout the 
1990s and into the early 2000s it is evident that while the Bangkok middle class was the 
most politically aware, the majority low-income Thais outside the city center would come 
to rule election outcomes. Incentivized to vote either by vote buying or by populist 
promises by candidates, voter participation in the rural provinces increased under the new 
constitution. As Thaksin pursued populist changes and rallied the low-income workers 
around the country, he was able to obtain an outright majority in government, challenging 
traditional Thai politics and angering the Bangkok middle class and establishment. 
Leading up to the 2001 elections, it is apparent that a divide was forming in 
politics and in society. A new peak in polarization formed with Thaksin as prime 
minister. He chose to use his political power to challenge the traditional role of the 
monarchy, Prem, and the military within Thai politics and society. However, he had not 
only a majority in parliament, but a large amount of support from rural areas in the north 
and northeast. In Bangkok, though, middle class citizens saw Thaksin as corrupt and 
untrustworthy. As the PAD held mass protests against his election win in 2005, it seemed 
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that Thaksin would win again in the snap elections through his mass support outside the 
capital. Before the elections were complete, however, the military, supported by the 
monarchy, conducted a military coup, removing Thaksin from office and the country but 




















III. POLITICAL INSTABILITY 2006–2011 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the military coup in 2006 to the election of Yingluck Shinawatra in 2011, 
the political instability created by political and social polarization did not go away. In this 
time period, efforts to re-stabilize Thai politics through a new constitution, military 
transfer of governmental control back to Thai citizens, and new elections, resulted in 
frequent changes in government, mass protests, and increased polarization. While 
Freedom House upgraded its rating of Thailand from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” 
following elections in 2007, continued political instability kept the country from being 
rated as “Free” like it was from 1998–2005.115 Deep divisions between Red and Yellow 
Shirt ideologies depict societal polarization throughout Thailand, resulting in continued 
political instability. The 1997 constitutional changes that encouraged a two-party system 
also contributed to further political polarization during this time period. This chapter will 
show that while the military conducted a coup in order to oust Thaksin and restore 
democracy within Thailand, the time period that followed continued to weaken Thai 
democracy. 
B. FROM MILITARY RULE TO YINGLUCK 2006–2011 
1. The Council for National Security 
The military took control of the government on September 19, 2006. That 
evening, military leaders traveled to Chitlada Palace, where they met with the King, 
Queen, and Prem to voice their reasons for the coup and plans for the future. Despite little 
evidence pointing to the monarch’s role in the coup, there is little doubt that the military 
saw itself as acting in the service of the King. Soldiers around Bangkok could be seen 
wearing yellow arm bands, and tanks had yellow ribbons on their barrels. It was evident 
that following the coup, the military was aligned with the monarchy, and the future 
                                                 
115 Patrick Ziegenhain, “Military Influence on the Regression of Democracy in Southeast Asia,” 
European-Asian Journal of Law and Governance 1, no. 2 (2011), 264. 
 46
decisions made while it was in power would ensure that the traditional role of the 
network monarchy in Thai politics would not be shored up. 
Its main focus was the restoration of stability in Thai politics. However, in order 
to do so, the military and monarchy, along with their supporters, needed to make changes 
to the governmental system. The election, originally set for October, was delayed a year, 
and public gatherings and political party activity were proscribed and the constitution was 
suspended. The senate and the parliament were also dissolved. While some supporters, 
such as the PAD, saw these as necessary steps toward creating a democratic regime that 
was less corrupt, the military leaders found themselves facing international and domestic 
condemnation for their overthrow of an elected government. However, the military 
continued to defend their choice to conduct a coup, and continued to look for a new 
prime minister who could restore democracy. 
While in control, the military capitalized on its power, reversing many 
unfavorable changes imposed by Thaksin. The military budget, which had been declining 
since 1992, saw an increase of 34 percent.116 While the military saw the largest cuts 
during the 1997 financial crisis, these cuts had never been restored once the economy 
recovered. Other changes included reinstating Prem’s Southern Border Provinces 
Administration Center, and reviving the military’s political role in the fight against the 
Malay-Muslim insurgency. Further changes favored by the military were included in the 
new 2007 constitution, addressed later in this chapter.117 
The military did not wish to have the lack of legitimacy it experienced following 
the 1991 coup and “Black May” massacre. Therefore, it attempted to shore up its 
popularity by continuing most of Thaksin’s populist programs. The much supported 
health care program received even more praise as the military chose to make the 30 baht 
medical care free.118 The military junta, officially called the Council for National 
Security (CNS), promised the Thai people that a civilian government would be 
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established within a year of the coup. In order to accomplish this, a new constitution had 
to be drafted that met the requirements of the military and monarchy. 
2. The 2007 Constitution 
Less than a year after the coup, on August 19, 2007, a public referendum 
approved a new constitution. With members appointed by the military, the Constitutional 
Drafting Assembly (CDA) took six months to create the final draft. Despite the attempt 
of the military to create a legitimate constitution, concerns about the military’s influence 
over the drafting process began before it even started. The selection of the CDA was 
influenced by the military and the royal networks behind them. The list of 200 candidates 
who were later a part of the CDA did not include farmers and laborers. Rather candidates 
were drawn mainly from the urban elites who represented traditional bureaucratic civilian 
and military interests associated with the Thai monarchy.  
Members of the CDA were responsible for selecting 25 members to be formed 
into the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). Critical leadership positions with the 
CDA and CDC were given to those who were supportive of the military junta and the 
monarchy. This led to a one-sided group of individuals that took part in the drafting of 
the new constitution, mainly composed of “the royal military bureaucratic circle and anti-
Thaksin academic counterparts.”119 The alienation of certain groups, mainly Thaksin 
supporters, added to the polarization that divided those who supported an active political 
role for the military and monarchy, and those who did not.120  
The goal of the military and their civilian allies in drafting a new constitution was 
to counter the developments made by the 1997 constitution that led to Thaksin’s 
consolidation of power. More specifically, the changes aimed at reducing the influence of 
the rural and urban majority in the electoral process.121 In order to achieve this, the 
military had to ensure that those involved in the process were sympathetic to their cause. 
Jim Ockey states, “The new constitution met opposition both from activists who saw it as 
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less democratic than the 1997 document and from supporters of Thaksin, who treated it 
as a referendum on the coup. The military, on the other hand, saw the referendum as 
providing legitimacy for its actions.”122  
Changes to the constitution aimed at preventing any similar concentration of 
political power that Thaksin had while in office. First, an eight-year term limitation was 
placed on the prime minister’s term in office. While the 1997 constitution was designed 
to strengthen the executive branch and improve the fragmented parliament system by 
giving more power to the prime minister and parties, the new constitution aimed at 
restoring some power to individual elected representatives. Other changes included “The 
threshold for a vote of no confidence was lowered; the size of the National Assembly was 
reduced from 500 to 480; and members of parliament (MPs) no longer have to give up 
their seats in order to join the cabinet.”123 The new constitution also revamped the senate, 
requiring that only half of the senate would be elected, leaving the other half to be 
handpicked by members within government.124  
While the 2007 constitution overturned the provisions in the 1997 constitution 
that had led to the centralization of power within the executive, many people argued that 
the 2007 constitution marked a clear step backward from democracy. Unlike the drafting 
of the 1997 constitution, which involved public consultation, the military control of the 
drafting process in 2007 led to minimal public participation and support.125 Once the 
draft was completed, it was sent out to over 20 million households for review prior to a 
vote. Billboards read: “Love the King. Care about the King. Vote in a Referendum. 
Accept the 2007 Draft Charter.”126 Despite having the public vote on passing the 
constitution, the military left almost no room for anyone to vote “no.” CDC Secretary 
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Somkid Lertpaitoon threatened that if the new constitution was not passed, a prior 
constitution approved before 1997 would be reinstated. Those who voiced their 
opposition to the constitution were met with heavy resistance from the military, which 
passed last-minute legislation that imposed heavy fines and even jail sentences against 
those agitating against the draft.127 Most resistance to the new constitution was found in 
the north and northeast, known for their support of Thaksin and the now-disbanded TRT 
Party. Thirty-five provinces within these areas remained under martial law leading up to 
the referendum. While the draft was approved by 57 percent of the country, the actions 
taken by the military to ensure that the constitution was passed with limited public debate 
were seen by many as undemocratic.128 
3. Political Polarization – Yellow Shirts Protest 
From October 2006 to January 2008, Surayud Chulanont, a former army chief and 
member of the King’s Privy Council, served as the interim prime minister.129 The first 
elections held after the coup occurred in December 2007. Following the dissolution of the 
TRT, a new party named the Phalang Prachachon Party (People’s Power Party [PPP]) 
was formed. The party was known for being loyal to Thaksin, and, like the TRT Party in 
2001, was able to form a strong coalition party that was capable of winning the most 
seats in parliament with 233 out of 480. The leader of the party, Samak Sundaravej, was 
elected as prime minister and took office in January 2008. 
Prior to the elections Samak announced that, “I am a nominee of Prime Minister 
Thaksin, I will make the party strong so that democracy can be restored in this 
country.”130 Should he win, he promised that he would amend the military-backed 
constitution and support an amnesty for politicians, like Thaksin, who had been banned 
from politics. The threat of having a proxy government run by Thaksin led Democrat 
Party member Chaiwat Sinsuwong to bring legal action against the PPP. His argument 
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was that the PPP was essentially the same party as the banned TRT Party, thus violating 
electoral rules. The legality of the issue proved to be complicated, as the PPP received 
millions of votes based on the TRT connection. Before receiving a court ruling, 
Democrat Party leaders, who were opposed to the case, were able to convince Chaiwat to 
withdraw his case, leading him to quit the party shortly after.131 
Just over a month after Samak took office term, Thaksin returned to Thailand on 
February 28. Using Samak as a proxy, Thaksin was able to weave his way back into 
politics. Foreseeing a possible change to the constitution that might allow Thaksin to 
return to politics officially, in March the PAD reassembled and planned to conduct 
protests beginning in May.132 In July, Thaksin and his wife went to trial for a series of 
charges for tax evasion, which led to the first verdict finding his wife guilty. However, 
the couple was allowed to leave the country to attend the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. 
Following the conclusion of their trip to the Olympics they chose not to return, causing 
the Supreme Court to issue arrest warrants on both. 
 Rather than declare victory, the PAD chose to continue to protest, arguing that 
Thaksin should pay for his crimes and the government should be dissolved so that a 
government not allied to Thaksin could be elected.133 On August 26, PAD leader Sondhi 
Limthongkul led supporters in a rally deemed “the last whistle blow.” The plan was to 
block government buildings, major roads, and two airports in an effort to convince the 
government to dissolve. While the PAD hoped to gain 300,000 protesters, numbers were 
much smaller, closer to 30,000. Nevertheless, the PAD successfully blocked streets and 
occupied several government buildings, to include the Government House, which 
displaced the prime minister from his office. On August 29, PAD members occupied 
international airports in Phuket, Krabi, and Hat Yai, causing many flights to be 
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canceled.134 In response to the protests, Samak stated, “I, the prime minister, have come 
to office in the righteous way and I won’t resign…I will not back down. I will rule this 
country and lead it through all of the problems.”135 
On September 9, the Constitutional Court in a 9–0 decision ruled that Samak had 
violated the constitutional ban against outside employment after he participated on two 
television cooking shows. This event highlighted that institutions that Thaksin did not 
control could be used against him and his supporters. The court stated that due to the 
violation, the cabinet and prime minister had to leave office. Despite an opportunity for 
Samak to be reappointed by his own party, the PPP chose to appoint Somchai 
Wongsawat under the assumption that without Samak, the political crisis would end. 
Under advisement from Thaksin, Somchai, married to Thaksin’s younger sister 
Yaowapha, was appointed as prime minister. The PAD, rather than seeing Samak’s 
departure from government as a victory, chose to continue to protest, again stating that 
their goal was to root out all Thaksin influence in government and to continue to oppose 
pending constitutional amendments that could allow Thaksin to return to politics.136 
The PAD chose to go on the offensive again, this time blocking MPs inside 
parliament. When police came to clear a path for those inside to exit, violence erupted. 
By the end of the riot, two protesters were left dead and over 400 were injured. The 
deaths of the PAD members were blamed on the police, and popular sentiment, at least 
among the middle and upper class, swung against the government. The monarchy also 
chose to show its support for the PAD protesters, as the Queen established a medical aid 
fund for those injured and attended the funeral of one of the protesters. Her actions had a 
profound impact on the PAD, as the Queen’s assistance was viewed as indicating royal 
support for their cause. 
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On October 21, 2008, Thaksin was found guilty by the Supreme Court of 
corruption and sentenced him, in absentia, to two years in jail.137 The United Front of 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as “Red Shirts,” was formed shortly 
after the conviction of Thaksin. They were Thaksin supporters who opposed the Yellow 
Shirts and the 2006 military coup. In a large stadium in Bangkok, 80,000 Thaksin 
supporters gathered for the first time to hear from Thaksin via a phone call. Following the 
event, demonstrations began to occur around the country as Thaksin supporters voiced 
their support of the current government and the hopeful return of their former prime 
minister. As pro-Thaksin rallies increased, tension increased between UDD and PAD 
demonstrators. Episodes of violence between the two groups became frequent, several 
involving bombings. 
As the UDD strengthened, the PAD began to prepare for what its leaders called 
“the last battle.” On November 24, PAD supporters gathered to implement the “King 
Taksin Operation.”138 The plan was to force the unconditional resignation of Prime 
Minister Somchai by seizing parliament; the Finance Ministry and other financial centers; 
the Don Muang airport; and the Suvarnabhumi international airport.139 The police, 
military, and monarchy did not issue statements or intervene. In the end, the activist 
Constitutional Court intervened and chose to release its decision on the PPP and two 
other parties’ alleged vote-buying case.140 The ruling was against the supporters of 
Thaksin, as all three parties were ordered to be dissolved and their executives, to include 
Somchai, to be banned from political participation for the next five years. While the PAD  
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claimed victory, they stated that “if the new government was not to its liking, it would 
again take control of the airports, deeming the heavy economic cost as a small price to 
pay in defense of nation and king.”141 
4. Political Polarization – Red Shirts Protest  
After the PPP was dissolved, the Democrat Party became the majority party 
within parliament and, subsequently, placed their leader as prime minister. On December 
17, 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva, an Oxford graduate, was selected to take the office of prime 
minister. Pledging in his swearing in ceremony speech to defend the monarchy, Abhisit 
came to power mainly through the support of the network monarchy and his ability to 
win over parties that had originally sided with Thaksin. This was mainly due to the 
lobbying of Army Commander General Anupong Paochinda. With a Democrat Party 
member as prime minister who was accepted by traditional elites, some scholars feared 
that some of the nondemocratic elements present in Thai politics in the 1990s would 
return. Chairat Charoensin-o-larn states that the appointing of Abhisit marked a return of 
the “old nam nao (polluted) type of dirty/money politics typical in Thai politics….”142 To 
make matters worse, allegations of widespread corruption tainted Abhisit’s 
administration. While leaders of the 2006 coup had used corruption as the main reason 
for ousting Thaksin, the Democrat Party government, backed by the military, did not 
receive any pressure from the military. Chairat even points out that the media did not pay 
much attention to the corruption, stating, “The only corruption that gets attention is that 
which is linked to Thaksin and his proxy governments.”143 
In late February 2010, UDD plans surfaced for a mass protest against the Abhisit 
government. While the movement laid low as long as Thaksin’s supporters were in 
power, the appointment of Abhisit caused them to become increasingly active.144 The 
intent of the protest was to mobilize a million Thais in Bangkok and help convince the 
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government to step down and call for new elections. The Red Shirts believed that 
Abhisit’s government was illegitimate because it was not based on the majority party, 
rather a coalition formed under military pressure.145 The earlier success of the PAD in 
bringing down the PPP illuminated the notion that, with enough public pressure, it was 
possible to change the nature of Thai government. Other aims of the UDD included the 
reinstating of the 1997 constitution, which would effectively dissolve all the legal and 
political changes imposed after the 2006 coup. In an interview with the New York Times, 
a UDD leader stated, “Our aim is to topple the government, force them to make a choice 
between suppressing us and stepping down.”146 Starting on March 12, Red Shirts walked 
around Bangkok, performing symbolic protests such as the pouring of 1,000 liters of 
protestors’ blood at Parliament and Abhisit’s house. For two weeks they protested 
without incident, and at the end of March, the government offered to sit down with UDD 
leadership to discuss a possible compromise.147 
While both sides hoped that a possible resolution could be reached, negotiations 
failed due to disagreement over a new election date. The Red Shirts called for the 
dissolution of the current administration within two weeks, while the government offered 
a nine-month deadline. The failure of negotiations caused tensions to rise between the 
two sides. On April 7, UDD members stormed Parliament, causing the government to 
declare a state of emergency. Under a state of emergency, the military was given the 
power to restore order, causing the mood of the protesters to switch to a high expectation 
of violence. On April 10, the military and UDD clashed, leaving five soldiers and over 20 
Red Shirts dead. While UDD members hoped that the protests that began in March would 
lead to political change, the expectation of change increased following the bloody clash 
in April. However, it was not until May that the Abhisit government would reach out to 
the UDD leadership again to meet for new negotiations.148 
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The government offered to have elections in November, and provided a 
“Roadmap to Reconciliation” that included social and economic reform along with an 
independent probe into the April violence. The response from the UDD was divided. 
While at the meeting they chose to accept the offer, those who opposed the agreement 
argued later that the roadmap document allowed the Democrat Party to maintain certain 
powers within government that could undermine the new government. Thaksin agreed 
with those who opposed the offer, and urged the UDD to continue its rallies in the capital. 
Violence increased in May, leading to many more deaths. On May 13, Major General 
Khattiya, a military leader who allied himself with the Red Shirt protesters, was 
assassinated.149 Over the next week, gunshots and explosions could be heard around 
Bangkok. Reports by May 19 showed over fifty civilians had died during the mass 
protests.150 
One year later, on May 9, 2011, Abhisit announced that elections would take 
place in July, six months earlier than scheduled. This event is important, as it marked 
Abhisit’s willingness to accede to the demands of the protesters, albeit on his own 
schedule. The death of civilians the prior year and continued small-scale protests led 
Abhisit to make the decision that it was time to allow the country to choose its leaders 
again in a new democratic election. In a press conference the prime minister stated, “It is 
again a new start for people to move Thailand forward and to solve various problems of 
people and their families efficiently under democratic means.”151 The election marked 
the possible decline of polarization within Thai politics.  
5. Yingluck Elected as Prime Minister  
On August 5, 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, a sister of Thaksin, was voted into 
office as the first female prime minister in Thai history. The newly formed Pheu Thai 
Party (PTP) was the latest Thaksin-supporting party, following the banning of the 
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previous two. The PTP was able to obtain 296 seats in the 480 seat parliament, giving 
Yingluck a cushion of support as she entered office. Despite being an obvious proxy for 
her older brother, as indicated by his primary role in picking almost her entire cabinet, 
Yingluck is at a significant disadvantage as prime minister. She does not have any 
experience in Thai politics. This means that she has to rely on the experience and advice 
of her party and her brother. Others, though, such as the Red Shirts, believe that she will 
bring a fresh approach to many issues and lead Thailand to a new era of stability and 
democracy. 
Shortly after her election, Yingluck faced her first challenge as prime minister in 
October with what many called a 100-year flood. In an attempt to protect the capital, a 
series of dikes and runoff channels were formed to drive water around the city. But water 
still found a way to get into the city, eventually leading to extensive flooding that caused 
the domestic airport to close and numerous people to vacate their homes. Yingluck, a 
political novice, attempted to work with members of the Thai bureaucracy and military 
resolve the natural disaster. Interagency conflicts, lack of policy coordination among 
cabinet members, and perceived protection of Bangkok at the expense of central Thai 
rural provinces left the opinion of the government weak.152 Media outlets claimed that 
Yingluck’s leadership style is tainted with a tone of uncertainty and disorganization. 
However, her day-to-day devotion to flood management and disaster relief earned her 
some public sympathy, allowing her to emerge from the crisis with heightened stature 
and confidence. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The time period between 2006 and 2011 represents a time in which Thailand’s 
democracy was nearly destroyed. Despite the military returning control of the 
government to civilian in 2007, Thai politics remained sharply polarized between those 
who supported Thaksin, and those who did not. Polarization was strong before the 2006 
coup, then escalated following it, resulting in mass protests turning violent. The ousted 
Thaksin was able to maintain his influence in politics through proxy prime ministers, 
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escalating tension between elected governments and the military that ousted Thaksin, the 
monarchy that was challenged by Thaksin, and the PAD that viewed Thaksin as anti-
democratic. Despite the TRT being dissolved by the courts, Thaksin-supporting parties, 
such as the PPP and the PTP, were able to maintain a majority in government like the 
TRT had done prior to the 2006 coup.  
However, while pro-Thaksin parties were able to gain popular support, those who 
opposed the government, such as the PAD, military and monarchy, set out to return 
royalist elites to power. The social polarization that had been evolving since the 1990s 
peaked with mass protests within the 2006–2011 period. On one side was the Bangkok 
middle class, organized under the royalist group known as the PAD. The other side was 
composed of Thaksin-loyal farmers and low income workers united under the UDD. 
Through mass protests, seizures of government buildings and transportation hubs, these 
two groups were able to influence the government. Through mass protests, governments 
were pressured to dissolve their parliaments and allow new elections to occur. Once 
victory was achieved and the PAD, monarchy, and military-supported Democrat Party 
took power in government, the protest pendulum shifted to the UDD. Mass 
demonstrations broke out again, calling for yet another change of government. From 
2007–2011, a span of just four years, the government changed leaders five times. It is 
clear that instability in Thailand between 2006 and 2011 was the result of increased social 
and political polarization. 
The military throughout the Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt protests gave a clear 
message as to which side it supported. Two civilian governments, led by Samak and 
Somchai, gave orders to the military to stop the PAD’s siege of Government House and 
the airports in 2008, only to be refused by military leaders. Rather than stop the PAD 
protesters, military members recommended that the government either resign or dissolve 
the parliament. On the other hand, when Red Shirt protests broke out during the Songkarn 





reactions to protests by both the Red and Yellow Shirts depict a military that, while it 
claims to not wish to be involved in politics, clearly shows which side of the political 
polarization line it stands on.153 
As a result of the political and social polarization, instability in Thai politics 
remained apparent throughout 2006 to 2011. While the military successfully returned the 
power of the government back to the civilians, attempting to restore democracy within 
Thailand, the government remained unstable for the next several years. However, with 
Abhisit’s resignation from office in 2010 and Yingluck’s election into power, mass 
protests have been on a decline. With a popularly elected prime minister, despite her ties 
to Thaksin, the PAD has been more focused on thwarting the return of Thaksin into the 
country rather than trying to drive Yingluck from office. What remains unknown, though, 
is if the polarization has decreased enough for stability to return to Thai politics. 
                                                 




The Thai democratization process was filled with many constructive and 
destructive events between 1992 and 2011. While scholars saw the period from 1992–
2006 as a time in which democratic components within Thailand were forming, it is clear 
that due to polarization within Thai politics and society that democracy had not been 
consolidated. Following the 2006 military coup that ousted Thaksin from office, 
polarization increased even further, resulting in mass protests and frequent changes in 
government. Despite democratic elections in 1992 and the hope of many Thai citizens 
and politicians that Thailand would democratize, as of 2012 it has not fully democratized. 
This chapter aims to highlight the main points presented in chapters two and three that 
show how political polarization destabilized democracy in Thailand and undermined 
progress toward democratic consolidation. Furthermore, this chapter will also discuss the 
implications of political and social polarization for the democratization of Thailand in the 
future. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS 
1. 1992–2006 
Between 1992 and 2006, there appeared to be widespread evidence that 
democracy was being consolidated in Thailand. Following the “Black May” massacre in 
1992, the military was forced to step back from its traditional overt role in politics. As the 
military returned to its barracks, the new democratically elected government, led by 
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, was able to incorporate many changes into Thai politics 
that depicted democratic consolidation. Changes included strengthening civilian control 
of the military, changing the voting laws to encourage a larger turnout, creating an 
administrative court system, reducing the size of the appointed Senate, and improving 
equality for women.154 While corruption, vote buying, and frequent changes in 
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government continued to exist throughout the mid-1990s, the implementation of a new 
constitution in 1997 gave a clear sign to many that Thailand was on the right path toward 
consolidating its democracy. 
Several new accountability institutions such as the Election Commission, National 
Counter-Corruption Commission, and the Constitutional Court were formed in an effort 
to decrease corruption and vote-buying. More members of government now had to 
elected rather than be appointed, leading to a further decrease in the number and percent 
of military members in parliament. The separation between politics and the military, a 
fundamental requirement for a democracy, was apparent throughout the 1990s, pointing 
to the possibility that Thailand’s democracy was consolidating. Another constitutional 
change aimed at replacing Thailand’s fragmented party system with one with a much 
smaller number of parties represented in elections and parliament. This was accomplished 
by incentivizing the formation of coalition parties. The thought was that if parliament had 
fewer parties, there would be greater stability and staying power. As a result of these 
constitutional changes, many believed that Thailand was on the right track toward 
consolidating its democracy.  
In retrospect, it is evident that the democratic changes implemented by the new 
constitution laid the foundation for continued political instability and the overall 
weakening of democracy. Thaksin’s TRT Party was able to form a large coalition of 
parties and almost obtain a majority in parliament in the 2001 election and succeed in 
doing so in 2005. By promising reforms that would support lower income citizens, 
Thaksin remained popularly supported. With strong electoral legitimacy and solid 
support in parliament, Thaksin was able to challenge the traditional role of the network 
monarchy in politics. While the network monarchy was able to limit the influence of 
previous prime ministers whose interests did not align with those of the monarchy or 
military, Thaksin’s power was too great for them to control. 
Following the 2005 election, PAD protesters, composed of the Bangkok middle 
class, stormed the streets of Bangkok, calling for Thaksin to step down as prime minister. 
They accused the prime minister of abuse of power, insulting the monarchy, policy 
corruption favoring sectional interests, human rights abuses and interference in the 
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independent agencies of the state.155 At the height of the protests, the military stepped in 
and conducted a coup d’état that removed Thaksin from power. Overall, this time period 
reflects a sharp increase in polarization within Thai society and politics, reaching a new 
peak with the removal of Thaksin. Democratic elements, such as the introduction of a 
new constitution, while thought to point to a consolidated Thai democracy, failed to 
prevent the weakening of democracy caused by the evolving polarization between the 
Bangkok middle class, which supported the PAD, and the low income citizens in the 
north and northeast, who had voted for and continued to support Thaksin and the TRT 
Party. Furthermore, divides between those who supported the network monarchy, such as 
the Democrat Party, and those who did not, such as Thaksin and the TRT Party, added to 
the political polarization that culminated in the 2006 coup.  
2. 2006–2011 
Between 2006 and 2011, political and social polarization reached a peak. Divides 
between those who supported Thaksin and those who did not led to five changes in 
government, mass protests, and, at times, violence. While the military returned the power 
of the government back to civilians in 2007, politics remained unstable. Thaksin, living 
abroad, remained an influential figure in Thai politics through proxies. Red Shirts 
remained loyal to Thaksin, believing that he was removed from power undemocratically 
and that he should return to power since he was popularly elected. Those who opposed 
Thaksin, the militarily and royally supported Yellow Shirts, believed that Thaksin was a 
corrupt leader who threatened the proper working of democracy and the traditional role 
of the monarchy and should not be allowed to return to Thai politics. 
The social polarization led to mass protests that had a direct impact on the 
stability of Thai politics. If a Yellow Shirt-supported government was in power, the Red 
Shirts went to the streets in mass protests, calling for new elections. If a Red-Shirt-
supported government was in charge, the Yellow Shirts went to the streets, calling for the 
same thing. Furthermore, while certain leaders were convicted and accused parties were 
dissolved by new institutions formed by the 1997 constitution and the courts, social 
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groups took responsibility for the overthrow of governments they opposed. Many 
believed that if they did not like who was in power, their nonviolent mass street protests 
could influence change in Thai politics. As Kuhonta states, “Not only was political 
stability overrun by political hegemony and authoritarian practices, but ultimately the 
polity became deeply unstable as Thai society became sharply polarized.”156  
3. 1992–2011  
Reflecting over the time period 1992–2011 it is evident that polarization in both 
Thai politics and society caused enormous instability in Thailand. The rise of the PAD in 
2006 and their continued presence in Bangkok throughout the next several years 
weakened the democratic consolidation process within Thailand. While the Yellow Shirts 
do not wish Thaksin or any Thaksin-supporting party to return to power, at the same time 
they voiced their support for democracy in Thailand. While Thaksin still enjoys popular 
support, and was democratically elected in 2001 and 2005, he was removed from office 
undemocratically on the grounds that he was corrupt and challenged the traditional roles 
of the monarchy and military. Despite calling for snap elections in 2005 and still winning 
a majority of votes, the Yellow Shirts, the monarchy, and the military did not want him in 
power. Rather than waiting for elections to occur a few years later and trying to rally 
popular support for the Democrat Party, Yellow Shirts protested and called for Thaksin’s 
removal from office. The military, despite becoming more professionalized and less 
involved in politics since the early 1990s, chose to intervene and remove a democratically 
elected prime minister from power. The PAD and its supporters hailed the coup as a step 
forward for democracy. However, the international community and Red Shirts saw the 
coup as a clear step away from democracy. The unwillingness of the Bangkok middle 
class to accept the outcome of democratic elections and the military and monarchy’s 
unwillingness to have a prime minister in power who was not aligned to their traditional 
views and practices led to a coup. 
                                                 




 Political polarization peaked with the mass protests between the Red and Yellow 
Shirts, and since Yingluck took office in 2011 through election, polarization has 
decreased. While Yingluck is Thaksin’s sister, hinting at possible political conflict of 
interest, she has tried to avoid direct confrontations with her political opponents. While 
many wonder if she will help bring her brother back, she has not announced any plans to 
do so. Rather, she has promoted a reconciliation bill that aims to give amnesty to those 
involved in illegal activity during the mass protests starting in 2006. While the details of 
the reconciliation bill are still being debated, it is possible that if it is passed, Thai society 
could become less polarized. 
 Of course, given the volatility of the situation, it is possible that political 
instability could increase in the future. There are many influential leaders who could have 
a divisive impact on Thai politics. First, Thaksin still remains abroad, and as of 
September 2012, has not returned to Thailand. While not in the country, he has 
maintained the support of the Red Shirts, is still a large focus of much of Thai media, 
regularly broadcasts messages to his supporters, and is in close cooperation with and 
provides financial support to political allies within and outside the Pheu Thai Party. Many 
believe that Yingluck is a proxy for her older brother, and that the PAD will begin to 
protest in an attempt to rid the government of Thaksin’s influence. However, over the last 
year, while the PAD continued to voice its opposition to Thaksin’s proxy government 
under Yingluck, they have yet to stir enough public support for enough social 
mobilization to influence political change like they had in the past. However, if Thaksin 
returns to Thailand, polarization is quite likely to increase, resulting in mass protests and 
further political instability. The courts and judicial authorities are insisting that he serve 
time in jail for his corruption convictions, and his detention are certain to cause protests 
calling for his release.  
Directly related to the possibility of Thaksin’s return is the highly debated 
national reconciliation law. Some MPs are of the opinion that the amnesty should cover 
all those involved in illegal acts, starting from nonviolent protests carried out by either 
side since in 2006, to violent protests by the UDD in 2010 and afterward. An MP from 
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the ruling Pheu Thai Party, Surapong Towichukchaikul, stated, “For the country to 
achieve reconciliation, all parties should forgive. We should stop playing politics or our 
country will go nowhere.”157 He, along with many other members of the PTP believe that 
if the country reconciles, Thaksin will be able to return, and the country can move away 
from the past and toward a more united future. This stems from the belief that as long as 
Thaksin continues to receive attention by not being in Thailand, the country cannot 
reconcile its past and move forward. Thaksin supporters have even petitioned the King 
for an amnesty for Thaksin alone, an effort that his highly unlikely to come to fruition. 
Other MPs think the amnesty should not cover protestors or former government 
leaders. Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva said his party was not trying to block 
reconciliation but was taking a stance against attempts being made to whitewash offenses 
committed under the law. Abhisit stated, “As I see it, Thaksin is doing everything he can 
to elude his punishment and this is not reconciliation.”158 Many Yellow Shirts believe 
that Thaksin should not be pardoned for his abuse of power and that at a minimum, he 
should serve the sentence of two years in prison that was about to be issued by the 
Supreme Court before he fled the country. Thitinan Pongsudhirak says it best when 
discussing Thai opinions of Thaksin: “Thaksin’s name is synonymous with divisiveness. 
In deeply polarized Thailand, mentioning him seems to rouse either love or hate; few are 
lukewarm.”159 In this way, a reconciliation bill that allows Thaksin to return, whether 
with or without amnesty, would contribute to further instability. 
The King has also remained an influential leader in Thai politics and society. 
While it is evident that he seeks to preserve his traditional role in politics and has 
supported a gradual, peaceful transition to democracy, the introduction of democracy has 
decreased his influence. As the same time, he is still supported by the military and PAD, 
whose members believe that the monarchy should always play an important role in 
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politics and society. Thitinan believes that finding the right balance between democratic 
elements and a government that incorporates the monarchy will be the key to future 
stability in Thai politics. He states, “Thailand cannot escape the challenge of reaching a 
new consensus that will root the monarchy more squarely within the constitution of an 
emerging democracy, but in a way that reconciles conservative royalists.”160 At the same 
time though, many wonder how much longer the King will reign. Now 84 years of age, 
the King has suffered from serious illnesses over the last several years. Many wonder 
how much longer he will be alive, and how the monarchy and the Kingdom will be 
affected by his passing. 
 General Prem has been an influential figure in Thai politics since the 1980s. 
However, since the September 2006 coup, it appears he has become less so. By the 
summer of 2006, Prem had become a main target for Thaksin supporters, who labeled 
him Thailand’s leading anti-democratic force. On July 14, 2006, Prem stated:  
In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride horses. The jockeys do 
not own the horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey. It 
supervises soldiers but the real owners are the country and the King. The 
government supervises and employs us…What I mean is that we are the 
county’s soldiers. Governments come and go.161  
It is evident that Prem believes that the military will continue to be a part of Thai politics. 
Furthermore he continues to stress to the military that their allegiance is to the King, not 
to the civilian government. These two elements highlight threats to Thailand’s democracy 
in the future. Prem is now 92 years of age. Many wonder how the Privy Council will run 
without him in charge and how the network monarchy will function without his 
leadership. His passing will certainly be felt politically. 
Overall, it seems that Thai politics will only become stable when a political 
system is created that can accommodate the mobilized social forces within it. Currently, 
the military and monarchy pose two of the greatest threats to democracy. Ferrara states, 
“The extraordinary lengths to which the palace and the military have gone to preserve 
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their extra-constitutional prerogatives suggest that these institutions remain the foremost 
impediment to Thailand’s democratization, as well as the greatest threat to the stability of 
the country.”162 Without a political system that allows the military and monarchy to 
preserve their interests while at the same time allowing democracy to flourish, instability 
will always be possible.  
Through reconciliation of past political actions, a newly defined role for the 
monarchy in Thai democracy, and civilian control of the military, stability is possible in 
the future. Furthermore, accountability institutions must continue to expose and 
disqualify those who continue to use vote buying to become elected, or are corrupt while 
in office. While low income citizens might be less concerned about corruption within 
government, it is possible that if less corruption exists, the Bangkok middle class might 
be more supportive of non-Democrat Party leaders. With these necessary changes 
unlikely in the short to mid-term, instability will continue to exist in Thailand. 
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